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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS BANKRUPT DEBTORS A FRESH
START WITH THEIR FORMER SPOUSES' PROPERTY
In re Sanderfoot, 889 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, Ill S. Ct. 507 (1990)
In In re Sanderfoot,t the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a bankrupt debtor may avoid a lien on exempt
property arising from a divorce decree granting the lien to the former
spouse as part of the property division.2 The court rejected both the
Eighth Circuit's pre-existing interest theory3 and the Tenth Circuit's eq-
uitable lien theory,' thus creating a split among the circuits.
Gerald Sanderfoot and Jeanne Farrey were divorced in a Wisconsin
state court in 1987. The divorce decree awarded the marital home to
Mr. Sanderfoot and ordered him to pay Ms. Farrey $29,208.44 to achieve
an equitable property distribution.6 To secure payment of the amounts
owed the decree created a lien against the marital home.7 Less than
three months later, Mr. Sanderfoot voluntarily filed for bankruptcy and
moved to avoid the lien against the marital home pursuant to section
522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.8 The Bankruptcy Judge denied the
1. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
2. Id. at 605. To the extent a monetary award in a divorce decree constitutes alimony or
maintenance and support of a spouse, ex-spouse, or child, it is not a dischargeable debt under the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. 1990). In characterizing payments ordered in a
divorce decree, the mere recitation that the payments constitute alimony or maintenance and sup-
port is not controlling. A court instead must look beyond such labels to the actual nature of the
payments. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1990).
This Case Comment addresses the dischargeability of liens placed on the debtor's property to
secure the payment of a property division ordered in a divorce decree.
3. 899 F.2d at 601-03.
4. Id. at 604-05. Other courts have permitted the debtor to avoid such liens, either distin-
guishing or failing to consider the equitable lien theory. See In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1989); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1988) (equitable lien theory not applicable when
lien arose from statute rather than divorce decree).
5. 899 F.2d at 599.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 599 n.2.
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1990). Section 522(f) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an
interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien
is- (1) a judicial lien ....
I I U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
Section 522(b) permits the debtor to exempt property specified in § 522(d), or alternatively, to
exempt property under state or local law. II U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1990). See infra
note 14. Mr. Sanderfoot relied upon the Wisconsin homestead exemption, which exempts a debtor's
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motion, 9 but the district court reversed on appeal, ruling that the lien
was avoidable. 10 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court and
held: a bankrupt debtor may avoid a lien granted in a divorce decree as
part of a property distribution if the lien impairs an otherwise valid
homestead exemption.II
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 2 a debtor's property becomes property
of the bankruptcy estate. 3 The debtor may, however, exempt certain
property from the estate to protect it from liability for any prepetition
debt. 14 Although liens on exempt property normally survive bank-
homestead "[flrom execution, from the lien of every judgment, and from liability for the debts of the
owner to the amount of $40,000, except mortgages, laborers', mechanics' and purchase money liens
.. " Wis. STAT. § 815.20(1) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
Although not argued in the case, it is not clear that Ms. Farrey's lien impaired Mr. Sanderfoot's
exemption. Under Wisconsin law most liens against the homestead are unenforceable, but not void.
Id. Arguably, an unenforceable lien would not impair Mr. Sanderfoot's exemption, and thus
§ 522(f) would not apply. See infra note 17. Moreover, if the lien is an equitable purchase money
lien, it could not impair an allowable exemption because the Wisconsin homestead exemption ex-
cludes amounts subject to such a lien. Id. See Wis. STAT. § 815.20(1); infra note 14.
9. 899 F.2d at 599-600.
10. Id. at 600.
11. Id. at 605-06.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990). The estate includes all the debtor's legal and
equitable property interests. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Upon the debtor's filing of bankruptcy, holders
of estate property must deliver the property to a trustee. I1 U.S.C. § 542. The code gives the trustee
broad administrative and equitable powers over the estate. See I 1 U.S.C. §§ 361-66, 544, 545, 547,
and 549.
14. Section 522(c) provides: "[P]roperty exempted under [§ 522] is not liable for any debt of
the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case.. . ." 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (Supp.
1990). The debtor must elect either the federal exemptions listed in § 522(d) or available state and
local exemptions. The debtor cannot mix federal and state exemptions. 3 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY § 522.02 (15th ed. 1990).
If the debtor elects state exemptions, it is unclear whether § 522(f)(1)'s lien avoidance mechanism
applies to a lien enforceable under state law despite the exemption. In In re Snow, 899 F.2d 337 (4th
Cir.), pet. for cert. filed, Green v. Snow, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 90-44 (July 2, 1990), the Fourth Circuit
held that § 522(f)(1) would apply to such a lien because the state exception is inconsistent with
§ 522(f)(1) and the Bankruptcy Code trumps state law.
Section 522(f) allows the debtor to avoid a lien to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption to
which the debtor is entitled under subsection (b). 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1979). If under subsection (b)
the state has opted out of the federal exemptions, some courts take the position that § 522(f) restores
to the debtor the full state law exemption, including any state law exceptions to the exemption. One
court adopting this position compared the exemption to wedge of swiss cheese:
[j]ust as the entirety of the wedge is composed of both cheese and the holes, the entirety of
the homestead exemption is composed of both the substantive provision allowing a debtor
to exempt certain property and the exceptions to that exemption which, in the metaphor,
constitute the holes.
In re Stone, 119 Bankr. 222, 229 n.18 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1990) (citing Green v. Snow, pet, for
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ruptcy, 15 section 522(f)(1) permits the debtor to avoid a judicial lien1 6 on
the debtor's property to the extent that the lien would impair the debtor's
exemptions.
17
Courts holding that a lien on exempt property granted to secure pay-
ment of a court ordered property settlement is not avoidable rely on
cert., 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) 744 (Aug. 9, 1990)); see also Owen v. Owen, 877 F.2d 44, 47 (11th
Cir. 1989) (no impairment because exemption is specifically subject to exception), cert. granted, 110
S. Ct. 2166 (1990); In re Scott, 12 Bankr. 613, 616 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (language of subsection
(f) allowing debtor to avoid liens "to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection
(b)" reinstates state exemptions as is--including any exceptions that also exist under state law).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 522(cX2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1990). "The bankruptcy discharge will not prevent en-
forcement of valid liens" even though the lien is attached to exempt property. H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6317
(reaffirming the rule set out in Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886)). Thus, the bankruptcy dis-
charge only protects debtors from in personam liability, and does not prohibit a lienholder from
proceeding against the property in rem, even though the debtor's personal liability for the debt
underlying the lien is discharged. See In re Pence, 905 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1990) (lien would have
survived but for trustee's action avoiding lien and providing for full payment of underlying debt);
Isom v. United States, 901 F.2d 744, 74546 (9th Cir. 1990) (tax lien against debtor's property sur-
vived despite discharge of debtor's underlying personal liability); Chandler Bank of Lyons v. Ray,
804 F.2d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1986) (bank's lien on collateral survived discharge of underlying debt);
John Deere Indus. Equip. Co. v. Nason, 22 Bankr. 690, 691 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (unavoided liens
survive bankruptcy unaffected).
16. A "lien" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a "charge against or interest in property to
secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (Supp. 1990). A
"judicial lien" is defined as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equi-
table process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (Supp. 1990). The Bankruptcy Code defines two
other types of liens: a "statutory lien" arises "solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances
or conditions. . ." and a "security interest" is simply defined as a "lien created by an agreement." 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(47), (45) (Supp. 1990). These three types of liens are "mutually exclusive and are
exhaustive except for certain types of common law liens." H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
312 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6269.
In In re Stone, 119 Bankr. 222, 227 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1990), the court stated that the three
main types of liens-judicial, statutory, and security interests-are not mutually exclusive. Instead,
the court stated that certain common law liens constitute exceptions to the exclusivity of the Code's
definitions. Id. at 227-28.
The Stone court's construction contrasts with the apparent purpose of Congress: to define three
mutually exclusive categories of liens. A better approach might recognize multiple liens arising from
a single debt. For example, a creditor could foreclose on her collateral by obtaining a judicial lien,
with the security interest remaining intact as a separate lien until the debt is satisfied or the property
liquidated. Cf In re Seidel, 752 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 522(fX1) (1979). If a state's homestead exemption renders liens against the
homestead unenforceable, the lien arguably impairs nothing. See In re Goodwin, 82 Bankr. 616
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). But see In re Calandriello, 107 Bankr. 374 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (lien
impairs exemption because lienholder may enforce lien in the future if the property loses its home-
stead status and thus the lien represents a cloud on the title); In re Watson, 116 Bankr. 837, 838-39
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (judgment lien clouds the title of homestead property and thus is
avoidable).
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either the pre-existing interest18 or the equitable lien' 9 theory.
The Eighth Circuit first advanced the pre-existing interest theory in
Boyd v. Robinson.20 In Boyd, a divorce decree awarded the marital home
to the debtor "subject to" a lien securing the debtor's payment of the
property settlement.21 After filing for bankruptcy, the debtor claimed
the home as exempt property and argued that the lien should be
avoded.22 The district court refused to avoid the lien and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the lien merely recognized and provided a
remedy for the non-debtor spouse's pre-existing interest in the marital
home.2 3 Therefore, the lien did not attach to the debtor's property inter-
est.24 Since the lien did not attach to an interest of the debtor, the court
refused to avoid it under section 522(f)(1). 25
18. See In re Donahue, 862 F.2d 259, 264 n.7 (10th Cir. 1988); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d
1112 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Rittenhouse, 103 Bankr. 250 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (lien created in
divorce decree to preserve non-debtor spouse's pre-existing interest); Zachary v. Zachary, 99 Bankr.
916 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989) (lien does not attach to interest of the debtor, rather debtor acquires
property already subject to the lien); In re Owen, 86 Bankr. 691 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (creditor's
lien attached simultaneously with acquisition of property); In re Sealblom, 45 Bankr. 445 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1984) (lien protected non-debtor spouse's pre-existing property interest); In re Thomas, 32
Bankr. 11, 12 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (dissolution decree simultaneously conveys one spouse's half
interest in homestead to debtor spouse and creates a lien in favor of non-debtor spouse). See infra
notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
19. See In re Borman, 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Lodek, 61 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1986) (wrongful taking of funds results in imposition of nonavoidable constructive trust); In re
Hart, 50 Bankr. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985). See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. When
the divorcees create a lien by express agreement and the court includes it in the divorce decree, some
courts hold that a nonavoidable security interest is created. See In re Sanders, 61 Bankr. 381
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) (inclusion of consensual lien in court order does not convert it from security
interest to judicial lien); In re Shands, 57 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985) (same); In re Rosen, 34
Bankr. 648 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983) (same); In re Dunn, 10 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981)
(same); In re Scott, 12 Bankr. 613 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (same).
20. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
21. Id. at 1113. The lien represented one-half the equity acquired jointly by the parties during
the marriage. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1114.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1114-15. Judge Ross dissented, arguing that the non-debtor spouse's pre-existing
interest was irrelevant because the lien was a judicial lien avoidable under the code. Id. at 1115. He
argued that the divorce decree extinguished the non-debtor spouse's pre-existing interest in the home
and replaced it with a lien securing a debt. Id. Judge Ross characterized the lien as a judicial lien-
a lien obtained by judgment- because the lien did not exist prior to the divorce decree. Id. at 1116.
Furthermore, he noted that no agreement, contract, or conveyance that would make the lien a secur-
ity interest or mortgage existed between the parties. Id. Finally, Judge Ross interpreted
§ 523(a)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that only alimony and support debts are
nondischargeable, as indicating congressional intent to allow the discharge of property settlement
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss2/8
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The Tenth Circuit in Maus v. Maus26 criticized Boyd's "convoluted
theory." In Maus, the property settlement decree awarded the marital
home to the debtor "free and clear" of the non-debtor spouse's claims
and ordered the debtor to pay $22,000 as a property division.27
Although the decree did not explicitly provide for a lien, the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted the possible creation of a judicial lien under Kansas law.28
The court ruled, however, that the decree's specific language extin-
guished the non-debtor spouse's pre-existing interest and, if a lien arose
under state law, it was an avoidable judicial lien impairing the debtor's
homestead exemption.29
The Ninth Circuit in In re Pederson " also rejected the pre-existing
interest theory. In Pederson, the divorce decree awarded the marital
home to the debtor, subject to an $8,000 lien on the home.3 The Peder-
son court declined to follow Boyd, reasoning that any interest the non-
debtor spouse has in the marital home "disappear[s]" after the divorce
decree.32 Thus, the lien attaches only to the debtor's interest because
only the debtor continues to have an interest in the marital home.3" The
court concluded that when a divorce decree grants the marital home to
the debtor subject to a lien in favor of the non-debtor spouse, the debtor
may avoid the lien under section 522(f)(1). 4
debts in bankruptcy. Id. The Boyd dissent has been influential in other circuits. See, e.g., In re
Sanderfoot, 889 F.2d 598, 601-03 (7th Cir.) (adopting Boyd dissent), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990), In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 939
(10th Cir 1988) (same). But see Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1990) (questioning whether
property division under a divorce decree constitutes a property settlement debt).
26. 837 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1988).
27. Id. at 937.
28 Id. at 938-39. Kansas law provides that any judgment rendered by a Kansas court "under
chapter 60 shall be a lien on the real estate of the debtor within the county in which judgment is
rendered." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2022(a) (1983). The Tenth Circuit noted that divorce proceed-
ings are commenced under chapter 60 of the Kansas statutes and the marital home was located in
the same county where the divorce was granted. 837 F.2d at 938 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2202(1) (1983)).
29 837 F.2d at 939 (citing with approval Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1115 (Ross, J., dissenting)).
30. 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 782. Although the debtor entered the marriage owning the home, the $8,000 lien
represented home improvements funded by marital community property. Id.
32. ld. at 783.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 782. The court found this result consistent with Congress' intent to allow the dis-
charge of property settlement debts, but not alimony and child support awards. Id. at 784 (citing 11
US.C. § 523(a)(5)(B)). See supra note 25. In addition, the court characterized without discussion
the non-debtor spouse's lien as a judicial lien. 875 F.2d at 782.
Washington University Open Scholarship
650 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:645
Shortly after deciding Maus,3" the Tenth Circuit entered the fray
again, this time holding that a lien created in a divorce decree survives
bankruptcy under the equitable lien theory. In In re Donahue 36 the di-
vorce decree gave the debtor the marital home "subject to" payment of a
cash settlement under the property division.37 The Tenth Circuit relied
on the divorce decree's language indicating the property as the source
from which the debtor would pay the debt.38 The court ruled that the
decree created an equitable lien or mortgage on the marital home because
the non-debtor spouse had a "right" to have the marital home applied to
payment of the debt.39 The court restricted its Maus holding' to situa-
tions in which specific language in the divorce decree cuts off the non-
debtor spouse's claim to the property, preventing attachment of a lien or
security interest.41 The Donahue court, however, did not decide whether
an equitable lien or mortgage is an avoidable judicial lien within the
scope of section 522(f)(1). 42
In In re Borman,"3 the Tenth Circuit reached the issue left undecided
in Donahue and held that a nondischargeable equitable lien attaches
when it is clear from the divorce decree that the property is the source of
payment of the debt.' The court reasoned that permitting the debtor to
avoid a former spouse's lien would "unjustly enrich" the debtor.45 Fi-
nally, the Tenth Circuit again limited Maus 46 to situations in which liens
35. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
36. 862 F.2d 259, 264 (10th Cir. 1988).
37. Id. at 260.
38. Id. at 265.
39. Id. The court also stated that permitting the debtor to avoid the non-debtor spouse's lien
would unjustly enrich the debtor. Id. But see Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989, 996 (8th Cir. 1990)
(Arnold, J., dissenting) (unjust enrichment is the "other side of the fresh-start coin").
40. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
41. 862 F.2d at 264-65.
42. Id. at 266 n.1l.
43. 886 F.2d 273, 275 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 274. In Borman, the divorce decree granted the marital home to the debtor, but
provided for the sale of the home and distribution of the proceeds to the non-debtor spouse if the
debtor failed to pay a cash settlement. Id. at 273.
45. Id. at 274. The court did not attempt to reconcile its holding that an equitable lien is
nondischargeable with the language of § 522(f)(1). Presumably, the court would distinguish be-
tween an equitable lien and a judicial lien. Congress arguably envisioned a "common law" lien
exclusive of judicial liens, security agreements, and statutory liens. See supra note 16. The Tenth
Circuit's holding in Borman is sound if such common law liens exist and include equitable liens.
Such liens would not be dischargeable because § 522(f)(1) applies only to judicial liens. See supra
note 8 for text of § 522(f)(1).
46. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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arise by virtue of a money judgment and the operation of state law,
rather than by specific language in a divorce decree.47
In In re Sanderfoot 48 the Seventh Circuit held that section 522(f)(1)
avoids a lien created by specific language in a divorce decree to secure
payment of the property division.49 The court rejected both the pre-ex-
isting interest5" and equitable lien theories.51 Instead, the court ruled
that the divorce proceeding "dissolved" Ms. Farrey's pre-existing interest
in the homestead.52 Noting that its position was consistent with the
"plain language" of the statute, 53 the court concluded that the lien cre-
ated by the decree attached to Mr. Sanderfoot's interest in the homestead
property. 54 The court also rejected any distinction between equitable and
judicial liens." The court noted that the Code's definition of "judicial
lien" includes liens obtained by legal proceedings.56 Because a Wisconsin
state court judgment created Ms. Farrey's lien, the court held that the
unambiguous language of the statute controlled.57 Rejecting the equita-
ble lien rationale as "strained," the court concluded that whether labelled
equitable liens, vendor's liens, or security interests, a lien arising from a
court ordered property division is a judicial lien.5" Therefore, the
Sanderfoot court determined that the lien was avoidable because it was a
judicial lien fixed on the debtor's exempt property.59
Judge Posner, dissenting in Sanderfoot, ° embraced the pre-existing in-
terest theory, distinguishing a judicial lien intended to secure a spouse's
pre-existing interest in the marital home from a judicial lien on the
47. 886 F.2d at 274 (citing In re Donahue, 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988)).
48. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
49. Id. at 605.
50. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
52. 899 F.2d at 602 (citing with approval In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989)). See
supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
53. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(fXl)).
54. 899 F.2d at 602-03.
55. Id. at 603-05.
56. Id. at 603. The Bankruptcy Code defines a "judicial lien" as a "lien obtained by judgment,
levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(32)).
57. 899 F.2d at 605.
58. Id. at 604-05 (citing In re Boggess, 105 Bankr. 470, 474 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989) (finding
Boyd rationale strained and instead adopting position of Pederson line of cases)).
59. 899 F.2d at 605-06.
60. Id. at 606-08.
1991]
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debtor's property.6' Judge Posner asserted that the majority's decision
placed the "crown of success" on Mr. Sanderfoot's "vicious scheme" to
avoid the wife's hen and thus nullify the divorce decree, leaving him with
all the marital property instead of half.62 The dissent stated that Con-
gress' purpose in enacting section 522(f)(1) was to prevent creditors from
obtaining liens against a debtor's property in anticipation of bankruptcy,
thereby frustrating the purpose of the exemptions. 63 Because the divorce
decree did not create the hen to defeat the debtor's homestead exemp-
tion, but to protect Ms. Farrey's pre-existing property rights, Judge Pos-
ner argued that Ms. Farrey's lien was not the type Congress envisioned
when drafting section 522(f)(1)'s avoidance provisions. 64 Finally, the
dissent analogized to the situation in which a debtor acquires property
already subject to a hen.65 In such a situation the debtor cannot avoid
the lien because it attached when the debtor had no interest in the prop-
erty.6 6 Judge Posner argued that the same principle should apply when
creation of the lien occurs simultaneously with the debtor's acquisition of
61. Id. at 607.
62. Id. at 606. Over one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced the
principle that federal courts lack jurisdiction of family law matters. Rush, Domestic Relations Law:
Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (1984)
(citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859)). This "domestic relations exception" em-
bodies a federal judicial policy of abstaining from matters related to fundamental interests of the
states, especially divorce, child custody, and alimony. Rush, supra, at 1. Judge Posner's argument
that avoidance of Ms. Sanderfoot's lien would effectively nullify the divorce decree seemingly impli-
cates this doctrine and calls into question the bankruptcy court's power to set aside such a lien.
However, it is not clear whether the exception extends to property divisions arising from a divorce
decree. Id. at 7-8 (some courts interpret the exception narrowly while others interpret it broadly).
Moreover, the domestic relations exception applies only to a federal court's original jurisdiction; no
restriction exists on the power of a federal court to enforce a divorce decree rendered by a state
court. Id. at 13. Therefore, the exception may pose no obstacle to a federal bankruptcy court's
determining the impact of federal bankruptcy law and the parties' rights under a state court divorce
decree.
63. 899 F.2d at 606 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12627 (1977)). The legis-
lative history of § 522(f) states:
[The right to void a judicial lien on exempt property] allows the debtor to undo the actions
of creditors that bring legal action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy. Bank-
ruptcy exists to provide relief for an overburdened debtor. If a creditor beats the debtor
into court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his exemptions.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12627 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6087-88.
64. 899 F.2d at 606.
65. Id. at 607 (citing In re McCormick, 18 Bankr. 911 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (a debtor
cannot avoid a lien on an interest acquired after the lien attached); In re Stephens, 15 Bankr. 485
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1981) (same)).
66. 899 F.2d at 607. See supra note 16.
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the property.67 According to Judge Posner, the lien was not fixed on Mr.
Sanderfoot's property interest because the lien was created at the same
time he acquired the property.
68
The Sanderfoot majority correctly rejected the pre-existing interest
theory.6 9 The divorce proceeding dissolved Ms. Farrey's pre-existing in-
terest in the marital home and created a lien on Mr. Sanderfoot's prop-
erty interest.7° Mr. Sanderfoot's property interest in the marital home
existed before, during, and after the divorce proceeding. Therefore, it is
artificial to assert that he "acquired" property subject to a lien created by
the divorce decree.7'
The Seventh Circuit's rejection of the distinction between judicial and
equitable liens, however, does not withstand close scrutiny.72 The Bank-
ruptcy Code recognizes three types of liens: judicial liens, statutory liens,
and security interests. 73 Although the definitions are somewhat ambigu-
ous, the legislative history makes clear that the three types of liens are
mutually exclusive, except for certain common law liens.74 A divorce
decree, which specifically contemplates that the debtor's property will be
the source to satisfy the money judgment, imposes a lien derived from
equity.71 Though an equitable lien may require judicial action for en-
forcement, it owes its existence to common law principles of equity; thus,
it is not avoidable under section 522(f)(1). 76
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Sanderfoot gives bankrupt debtors a
license to nullify equitable property divisions created in divorce proceed-
ings. Though the court correctly rejected the "convoluted" pre-existing
interest theory, its rejection of the equitable lien theory is at odds with
67. 899 F.24I at 607.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
70. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 602. But see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
71. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 602-03. Judge Posner erroneously argues that the creation of
the lien simultaneously with the debtor's property interest is analogous to the debtor receiving prop-
erty with a lien already in place. Id. at 607. When a debtor receives property with a lien already
attached, the lien is fixed on the interest of the prior owner. However, in Sanderfoot the prior owner
was the debtor. Thus, Judge Posner's argument suggests a vacuum in time when no one has any
interest in the property. Construing the statute so that the lien attaches at this point, and then giving
the property encumbered by the lien to Mr. Sanderfoot seems somewhat artificial.
72. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 16.
74. Id.
75. See In re Borman, 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Donahue, 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir.
1988). See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 8 for the text of § 522(f)(1).
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the Tenth Circuit, which permits equitable liens to survive bankruptcy. 7
On review of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sanderfoot, the Supreme
Court should embrace the Tenth Circuit's position, which achieves jus-
tice while remaining consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.
Jeffery Scott Norman
77. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
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